Abubakar Shekau, the erstwhile leader of the terrorist group Jama’at Ahl al-Sunna li al-Da’wa wa al-Jihad (JAS), died in 2021. The west African group, also known as Boko Haram, then fell into obscurity while its breakaway faction, Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), steadily rose.
Early 2025 saw Boko Haram resurging in the Lake Chad region, however, with attacks in Nigeria and Cameroon. Lake Chad is in west-central Africa, in the Sahelian zone. It is located at the conjunction of Chad, Cameroon, Nigeria and Niger.
As a security studies scholar tracking Boko Haram, I discuss reasons for this resurgence, and its impacts, and recommend possible responses from Lake Chad region countries.
Evidence of Boko Haram resurgence
On 15 May 2025, Boko Haram massacred close to 100 residents of Mallam Karamti and Kwatandashi villages in Nigeria’s Borno State. A report has it that Boko Haram attacked the residents because they were loyal to, and served as informants for, Islamic State West Africa Province.
On 5 September, it attacked Darul Jamal village in Borno State, killing about 60 people. A researcher specialising in Boko Haram at the Institute for Security Studies, Taiwo Adebayo, was said to have spoken with residents of the community who attributed the attack to Boko Haram, possibly because of information about the group being shared with the Nigerian military.
There are also reports that the group has extended its reach beyond Lake Chad to North Central region of Nigeria, where it is operating with bandits and possibly Lakurawa, the new terrorist group in that region.
In Far North region of Cameroon, the group has also been active. Reports shared on LinkedIn showed that in July and August 2025, it was responsible for 101 attacks out of 144.
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What explains the resurgence
Four factors explain why Boko Haram has become more active again in the Lake Chad region.
First, the rise of one of its leaders, Bakura Doro, and his efforts to sustain Boko Haram gains over Islamic State West Africa Province.
Doro was the Lake Chad Amir al-Fiya (zone commander) before Shekau’s death. He was announced as the leader in May 2022 after a violent takeover from Sahalaba, a cleric whom Shekau had reportedly designated as his successor in his will. Doro reinforced Boko Haram by fighting Islamic State West Africa Province, killing members and capturing its territories in Lake Chad.
He also shunned media propaganda, thus taking the public gaze away from Boko Haram while it grew unnoticed. Although reports said Bakura was killed in Niger in August 2025, the group denied it.
The second factor is that it received less attention from the Lake Chad militaries. Instead, attention was on Islamic State for its targeted attacks on military outposts since early 2025.
By July 2025, 15 outposts had been attacked. The Lake Chad region countries’ counterterrorism efforts focused on countering ISWAP, dangerously neglecting Boko Haram.
The third factor is the failure of reintegration programmes across the region. In Nigeria, for one, community rejection, unmet government promises, limited political will and a weak framework have caused many ex-combatants to return to the trenches.
The fourth factor is combat stress or fatigue among soldiers of the Lake Chad region countries. For instance, more than 1,000 soldiers resigned from the army between 2020 and 2024 in Nigeria. Nigeria’s total armed forces personnel was estimated at 230,000 in 2020.
The weakened commitment of the countries to the Multinational Joint Task Force adds to the problem. Nigeria established the force in 1994 to checkmate trans-border armed banditry around the Lake Chad Basin. In 1998, Chadian and Nigerien soldiers joined the task force.
Niger’s withdrawal in protest against Ecowas sanctions; Chad’s declining support; and strained Nigeria-Cameroon relations have limited the effectiveness of the task force.
All this gives insurgent groups impetus to intensify their attacks.
Implications of resurgent Boko Haram
To understand the implications, it is essential to distinguish Boko Haram’s ideology from that of Islamic State. While the latter primarily targets military forces and non-Muslim communities, Boko Haram’s violence is aimed at all, except its members.
The attempt by Shekau’s successor, Sahalaba, to align with Islamic State West Africa Province’s more selective attacks led to his death, leaving Boko Haram rigidly committed to ruthless attacks.
The result might be a worsening of humanitarian conditions and disruption of community resettlement programmes in the region.
According to a June 2025 report of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the region hosts 2.9 million internally displaced people and 272,000 refugees. I believe this figure may rise as violence escalates. But donor funding is shrinking.
Boko Haram’s blend of jihad with criminal activities such as robbery and kidnapping not only sustains its operations but may also attract disaffected youth, given the region’s fragile socio-economic conditions, especially the high rate of poverty and unemployment.
The competition between both insurgent groups, and between them and the military, places civilians in danger. Each actor seeks local support and intelligence, and communities risk severe punishment if perceived as loyal to the opposing side.
A constraint currently confronting Boko Haram is the shortage of weaponry. To bridge this gap, I believe it may focus its attacks on military outposts across the region. They may be encouraged by the successes of Islamic State’s attacks on the military outposts and the transfer of combat experience and technical expertise from former Islamic State fighters who have defected to Boko Haram. If it joins the attacks against military outposts in the area, the consequences will be fatal.
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What can be done?
The governments and militaries of Lake Chad region countries should pay attention to Boko Haram as much as Islamic State in their counter-terrorism efforts.
There is a need to improve security cooperation among the countries by luring Niger back into the Multinational Joint Task Force and ensuring members’ commitment to the force.
Enhanced welfare services from the countries to their citizens can reduce incentives to join Boko Haram and other insurgent groups.
Strengthening defection programmes is crucial to prevent former terrorists from going back to groups like Boko Haram. I recommend harmonising regional deradicalisation efforts to enhance their effectiveness.
Saheed Babajide Owonikoko does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
